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Abstract 
We examined the psychology of “instigators,” i.e., people who surround an unethical act 
and influence the wrongdoer (the “actor”) without directly committing the act 
themselves.  In four studies, we found that instigators of unethical acts underestimated 
their influence over actors. In Studies 1 and 2, university students enlisted other students 
to commit a “white lie” (Study 1) or commit a small act of vandalism (Study 2) after 
making predictions about how easy it would be to get their fellow students to do so.  In 
Studies 3 and 4, online samples of participants responded to hypothetical vignettes, e.g., 
about buying children alcohol, and taking office supplies home for personal use.  In all 4 
studies, instigators failed to recognize the social pressure they levied on actors through 
simple unethical suggestions, i.e., the discomfort actors would experience by making a 
decision that was inconsistent with the instigator’s suggestion. 
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Underestimating Our Influence Over Others’ Unethical Behavior and Decisions 
 
Moody’s had just graded a pool of securities underwritten by Countrywide Financial, the 
nation’s largest mortgage lender. But Countrywide complained that the assessment was 
too tough. The next day, Moody’s changed its rating, even though no new and significant 
information had come to light. -Morgenson, 2008, New York Times 
 
Unethical acts are frequently conducted at the behest of someone else.  Other 
people can successfully goad us into doing things that make us uncomfortable because it 
is even more uncomfortable to say “no” (Sabini, Siepman, & Stein, 2001).  In the 
example described above, the Moody’s representative felt pressured to consider, and 
ultimately honor, Countrywide’s request to alter the ratings, the consequences of which 
were devastating to the housing market in 2007.  Although the ultimate decision to 
finagle Countrywide’s credit ratings was Moody’s, the Countrywide representative 
instigated the Moody’s representative’s unethical behavior.  
The current research contrasts the perspective of “actors,” i.e., individuals who 
ultimately engage in unethical behaviors, to “instigators,” i.e., individuals who influence 
or incite unethical behaviors.  Specifically, we examine the question of whether 
instigators recognize the awkward position they put actors in when they make an 
unethical request.  Drawing from previous research on help-seekers’ estimates of the 
likelihood that potential helpers will comply with their prosocial requests (Flynn and 
Lake [Bohns], 2008), we hypothesize that instigators will similarly fail to appreciate how 
uncomfortable it is for actors to say “no” to their unethical requests. The potential impact 
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of such a bias is clear.  If we do not recognize the extent to which our unethical 
suggestions and actions are likely to affect others’ behavior, we may be careless about the 
things we say and do.  
Previous research has demonstrated that people tend not to recognize the 
influence they have over others when making prosocial requests.  In a series of studies, 
Flynn and Lake (Bohns) (2008) had participants solicit a number of different help 
requests from passersby, e.g., asking people for the use of their cell phones, asking to be 
escorted to a location on campus, and soliciting donations for a charity.  Before making 
these requests, participants were asked to estimate how many people they would have to 
approach in order to get someone to say “yes.”  Participants in these studies consistently 
overestimated—by as much as 50 percent—the number of people they would have to ask 
to get someone to agree to their requests for help, i.e., people were far more likely to say 
“yes” to these requests for help than participants expected (see also Flynn & Bohns, 
2012; Bohns et al., 2011; Newark, Flynn & Bohns, in press).  
Yet despite the robustness of this effect, it is unclear whether it is limited to the 
domain of prosocial behavior, or whether it is likely to generalize to other types of 
requests, for example, unethical requests.  On one hand, participants in these studies may 
have simply underestimated others’ helpfulness.  On the other hand, participants may 
have underestimated the power of their own requests.  This latter possibility is 
particularly important from a theoretical standpoint because it suggests that the Flynn and 
Lake (Bohns) effect may extend to a wider range of influence scenarios than originally 
thought.  People may not simply be more likely to help us than we expect, but may be 
more likely to do what we ask than we expect, regardless of what we are asking.  
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Further, it is not obvious that these findings would extend to unethical acts. 
Research on people’s general impressions of others’ prosocial nature and ethicality 
suggests that people tend not to think very highly of others’ moral compasses.  For 
example, research on the “holier than thou effect” (e.g., Balcetis, Dunning, & Miller, 
2008) has demonstrated that people see others as less moral than themselves.  Similarly, 
research on the “norm of self-interest” (Miller, 1999) suggests that people see others as 
generally less charitable and more selfish than they actually are.  Instigators may 
therefore view pressuring another person to engage in an unethical act to be a much 
easier feat than getting someone to engage in a prosocial act. For these reasons, it would 
be particularly noteworthy if the Flynn and Lake (Bohns) (2008) findings extended to the 
domain of unethical behavior. 
We hypothesize that the same egocentric mechanism underlying the 
underestimation effect for prosocial requests will lead people to underestimate how likely 
others are to comply with their unethical requests. The tendency of help-seekers to 
underestimate the likelihood that their requests for help will be granted has been 
explained by a differential attention focus between help-seekers and potential helpers.  
Flynn and Lake (Bohns) found that potential helpers are particularly attuned to the social 
costs of saying “no,” or the awkwardness and embarrassment of refusing someone’s 
request.  Yet help-seekers tend to ignore these face-saving concerns (Bohns & Flynn, 
2010; Sabini, Siepmann, & Stein, 2001; Van Boven, Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2005), 
attending instead to other information, such as the instrumental costs a potential helper 
would incur by agreeing to a request (DePaulo, 1983; Greenberg, 1980; Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959). These different foci in turn lead to divergent beliefs about compliance: 
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potential helpers, focused on how awkward it would be to say “no,” are quick to comply 
with a request for help, while help-seekers, oblivious to the awkward position helpers are 
in, think their requests for help are unlikely to be fulfilled.   
We argue that instigators of unethical acts put actors in a similarly awkward 
position of feeling unable to say “no,” and are also similarly oblivious to this fact.  Much 
research has shown that social pressure is a remarkably powerful force in determining 
individuals’ decisions regarding whether or not to commit unethical acts (Gino, Ayal, 
&Ariely, 2009; Gino & Galinsky, 2012; Gunia et al., 2012; Milgram, 1963; Monin, 
Sawyer & Marquez, 2008; Webber, Schimel, Martens, Hayes, & Faucher, 2013; see 
Moore & Gino, 2013 for a recent review).  Just as it is difficult to say “no” to someone 
who is asking for help, it is difficult to say “no” to someone who is pressuring one to 
engage in an unethical act. Further, instigators of unethical acts, like help-seekers, are 
likely focused on other factors, such as the potential consequences of the unethical act 
(Jones, 1991; Paharia et al, 2009).  Instigators are therefore similarly likely to overlook 
the social costs to actors of saying “no.”  Once again, these different foci should lead to 
divergent beliefs about whether an actor is likely to participate in an unethical deed: 
focused on the awkwardness of standing up against social pressure, actors are likely to 
agree to go along with the unethical act, while instigators, oblivious to the awkward 
position they have put actors in, think it is unlikely they will comply. 
Overview of the Current Research 
In the current research, we tested the hypothesis that instigators would 
underestimate their influence over actors’ unethical behavior and decisions, i.e., actors’ 
decisions regarding whether or not to commit unethical acts, and how comfortable actors 
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would feel choosing to “do the right thing.”  The current work extends the findings of 
Flynn and Lake (Bohns) in which help-seekers underestimated their ability to get 
potential helpers to comply with their requests for help.  Accordingly, we conducted a 
series of four studies to test whether the original findings by Flynn and Lake (Bohns) 
would replicate in an unethical domain.  In our first two studies, we had student 
participants enlist other students to commit actual unethical acts.  In Study 1, participants 
enlisted their fellow students to tell a “white lie,” and in Study 2 they convinced them to 
vandalize a library book.  In both studies, participants made predictions about how 
effective they would be at getting others to commit these ethical transgressions, and we 
compared their predictions to how effective they actually were at getting others to engage 
in these acts.   
In our last two studies, we assigned participants to the perspectives of “Actor,” 
“Instigator,” or “Neutral Observer” in hypothetical unethical scenarios in order to test the 
egocentric mechanism we have proposed for the underestimation of influence effect.  We 
have suggested that instigators fail to fully appreciate the discomfort actors would 
experience by going against another person’s suggestion to engage (or not engage) in an 
unethical act.  As a result, instigators should be relatively insensitive to the effect their 
ethical suggestions have on actors. To test this prediction, we assessed instigators’ beliefs 
about how uncomfortable actors would feel engaging in various unethical acts following 
their unethical or ethical advice and compared instigators’ ratings to the discomfort actors 
themselves reported feeling after hearing such advice. 
In all four studies, we predicted that instigators would underestimate the social 
pressure they imposed on others through their simple suggestions to engage (or not 
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engage) in an unethical act. That is, instigators would not recognize how easily they 
could convince others to engage in unethical acts, and the extent to which their 
suggestions would affect others’ feelings about potentially engaging in unethical acts. 
Study 1: Getting Others to Tell a “White Lie” 
In Study 1, university students enlisted other students to commit a “white lie.”  
Before soliciting their fellow students, participants made a prediction about how easy it 
would be to get them to do so.  We compared participants’ beliefs about their capacity to 
get others to lie to their actual effectiveness at soliciting lies.  This design provided us 
with an initial test of our predictions in a realistic context using tangible behavioral 
outcomes. 
Method 
Participants 
 Fifty-two “primary” participants (31 Female; 21 Male) were recruited through 
campus flyers and paid $15 to solicit 198 “secondary” participants (104 Female; 94 
Male).  Seven primary participants dropped out of the study after reading the task 
instructions (before attempting to obtain any signatures) and were paid $5 to complete 
only the pre-task questionnaire.   
Procedure 
 Upon arrival to the lab, our “primary” participants were given a pre-task 
questionnaire.  In this questionnaire, participants read the complete task instructions 
before answering any questions about the task. An excerpt is below: 
“In this study, you will ask strangers (in person) to commit a small lie.  The lie you 
will be asking them to commit is to sign a form stating that you have given them an 
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introduction to a new course that is being offered by a Professor at UW.  You will 
not in fact give an introduction to this course…” 
Participants were also provided with the script they were to use when approaching 
people: 
“Will you sign this?  I’m supposed to tell students about a new course and get them 
to sign this form stating that they’ve heard about the course, but I really don’t want 
to do it.” 
 After learning the complete details of the task (no information was withheld), 
primary participants predicted how effective they would be at soliciting people to lie by 
providing a free-response answer to the question, “How many people do you think you 
will have to approach before you get 3 people to sign the signature sheet indicating that 
they’ve heard about the course you didn’t tell them about?”  This question was adapted 
for our purposes from Flynn and Lake (Bohns) (2008)1. To tap into their awareness of the 
social pressure they would impose on the individuals they solicited, primary participants’ 
were also asked to indicate on a 7-point scale how comfortable the people they 
approached would feel saying “no” to their request. 
 Participants were then provided with the following materials for their task: 3 
individual signature sheets stating, “My signature provided below indicates that the 
person who approached me gave me information about a new course at UW”; a pen; a 
tally sheet on which to record the responses and gender of each person they approached; 
debriefing forms for the secondary participants; a copy of the task instructions.  
Participants were sent to designated areas of campus to complete the task (to avoid 
multiple participants covering the same areas). Secondary participants who provided a 
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bogus signature were subsequently told that they were part of a study and were assured 
that they had not in fact done anything wrong.  They were then handed a debriefing sheet 
informing them about the details of the study. After getting 3 people to sign the forms, 
participants returned to the lab, completed a brief post-task questionnaire, and were 
thanked and paid. To ensure that all participants completed the task as instructed, 
participants were also thoroughly debriefed upon their return to the lab.  
Results 
We hypothesized that participants would underestimate their own influence over 
others’ unethical behaviors by overestimating the number of individuals they would have 
to approach to get 3 individuals to commit this “white lie.”  One participant made a 
prediction of 300 people and was excluded from all analyses as an outlier (56 SDs from 
the Mean). The predictions made by the seven participants who dropped out of the study 
after reading about the task were significantly higher (M=18.33, SD=19.19) than 
participants who completed the task (excluding the outlier: M=8.47, SD=5.14), F(1, 
48)=8.28, p=.006, suggesting that our results may be conservative. 
Predicted vs. Actual Compliance 
 Our primary prediction that participants would overestimate the number of people 
they would have to approach to get 3 people to agree to lie was confirmed.  We ran a 
repeated-measures ANOVA comparing participants’ predictions of the number of people 
they would have to approach (M=8.47, SD=5.14) to the actual number of people they had 
to approach before 3 people agreed to tell this “white lie” (M=4.39, SD=2.37), and found 
a significant difference in predicted versus actual compliance, F(1, 43)=32.87, p<.001 
(see Figure 1).  In fact, 40 of the 44 participants who completed the task (90.9%) 
 Underestimating our unethical influence 11 
underestimated the proportion of people they could convince to lie, 2(1, N=44)=29.46, 
p<.001. The fact that the proportion of participants who committed this error was so 
substantial suggests that this finding is not the result of a statistical anomaly. 
Social Pressure Mechanism  
 To explore the relationship between participants’ lack of awareness of the 
discomfort others’ would feel saying “no” to their requests and their accuracy in 
predicting their influence over others’ unethical behavior, we looked at the correlation 
between participants’ predictions of the number of people they would have to approach to 
complete the task and their “comfortable saying ‘no’” ratings (M=4.13, SD=1.40, 
Range=1-7).  These two variables were highly positively correlated r(44)=.48, p<.001, 
indicating that the more participants took into account the discomfort others would feel 
refusing to lie (the lower their ratings), the fewer people they believed they would need to 
approach with their request. In other words, the more participants recognized the social 
pressure inherent in their request, the more effective they (correctly) imagined they 
would be at getting people to lie.  
Discussion 
 As predicted, participants in Study 1 underestimated their ability to get others to 
engage in an unethical act, i.e., committing a white lie. However, it is possible that this 
“white lie” did not seem particularly unethical to the individuals being asked to commit 
it.  The unethical act itself was relatively minor, thus it may have been a case of “no 
harm, no foul.”  Further, secondary participants may have focused more on the possibility 
that they were helping out a fellow student in need than on the fact that they were doing 
so by committing a lie.  Although we believe that many coerced unethical acts may be 
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committed under the guise of “helping someone out,” we nonetheless felt it was 
important to replicate these findings with a more unmistakeably unethical act in Study 2.  
Study 2: Getting Others to Vandalize a Library Book 
Study 2 follows the same experimental design as Study 1.  However, in this study, 
we used a more unequivocally unethical act: vandalizing a library book.  University 
students once again solicited their fellow students to engage in this unethical action.  
Before doing so, they made predictions about how easy it would be to get other students 
to commit this act.  We compared participants’ beliefs about their capacity to get others 
to deface a library book to their actual effectiveness at getting others to do so. 
Method 
 Twenty-five “primary” participants (23 Female; 2 Male) were recruited through 
the psychology department participant pool’s recruitment website and paid $10 to solicit 
108 “secondary” participants (48 Female; 60 Male).  Two primary participants dropped 
out of the study after reading the task instructions (before attempting the vandalism task) 
and were paid $5 to complete only the pre-task questionnaire.   
 Upon arrival to the lab, our “primary” participants were again given a pre-task 
questionnaire.  In this questionnaire, participants read the complete task instructions 
before answering any questions about the task.  An excerpt is below: 
“In this study, you will ask strangers (in person) to commit a small act of vandalism.  
Specifically, you will ask them to write the word “pickle” on a page of a library 
book…” 
Participants were also provided with the script they were to use when approaching 
people: 
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“Hi, I’m trying to play a prank on someone, but they know my handwriting.  Will 
you just quickly write the word ‘pickle’ on this page of this library book?” 
 After learning the complete details of the task (again, no information was 
withheld), participants predicted how effective they would be at soliciting people to 
vandalize the book by providing a free-response answer to the question, “How many 
people do you think you will have to approach before you get 3 people to agree to write 
the word ‘pickle’ in a library book?”  To tap into their awareness of the social pressure 
they imposed on those they solicited, participants were asked the same question asked of 
participants in Study 1.  They were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale how comfortable 
the people they approached would feel refusing their request. 
 Participants were then provided with the following materials for their task: a hard-
cover book with a library reference number taped to the spine (the book was made to look 
identical to library books at the university campus library; see Figure 2); a pen; a tally 
sheet on which to record the responses and gender of each person they approached; 
debriefing forms for the secondary participants; a copy of the task instructions.  Once 
again, participants were sent to designated areas of campus to complete the task (to avoid 
multiple participants covering the same areas).  
Secondary participants’ verbal responses to the request, as recorded by the 
primary participants in a “comments” section of their tally sheets, gave us confidence 
that this act was indeed perceived as unethical by those who were asked to engage in it.  
A number of participants stated that they would not write in a library book, others 
asked to use pencil instead of pen2, some expressed concern about the possibility that 
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they or the primary participant would get into trouble, and others explicitly referred to 
the act as vandalism (see Table 1 for selected quotes from secondary participants). 
Individuals who agreed to write in the fake library book were subsequently told 
that they were part of a study, and were assured that the book was not a library book and 
that they had not in fact done anything wrong.  They were then handed a debriefing sheet 
informing them about the details of the study.  After getting 3 people to write on separate, 
clean pages of the book (in pen; see Figure 2 for an example), primary participants 
returned to the lab and were thanked and paid. Once again, to ensure that all participants 
completed the task as instructed, primary participants were thoroughly debriefed upon 
their return to the lab. 
Results 
We hypothesized that participants would underestimate their own influence over 
others’ unethical behaviors by overestimating the number of individuals they would have 
to approach to get 3 individuals to commit this small act of vandalism3.   
Predicted vs. Actual Compliance 
 Our primary prediction that participants would overestimate the number of people 
they would have to approach was confirmed. We ran a repeated-measures ANOVA 
comparing participants’ predictions of the number of people they would have to approach 
(M=10.73, SD=6.58) to the actual number of people they had to approach before 3 people 
agreed to vandalize the library book (M=4.70, SD=2.53), and again found a significant 
difference in predicted versus actual compliance, F(1, 22)=16.72, p<.001 (Figure 1).  In 
this study, twenty of the 23 participants who completed the task (87.0%) underestimated 
the proportion of people they could convince to vandalize the book, 2(1, N=23)=12.57, 
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p<.001.  
Social Pressure Mechanism  
 We again examined the relationship between participants’ “comfortable saying 
‘no’” ratings (M=4.72, SD=1.49, Range=1-7) and their predictions of the number of 
people they would have to approach in order to complete the task.  These two variables 
were again positively correlated r(24)=.31, p=.11 (although not significantly), indicating 
once again that the more participants took into account the discomfort others would feel 
refusing their suggestions, the fewer people they believed they would need to approach to 
complete the task.   
Discussion 
 The findings of Study 2 are highly consistent with those of Study 1 (see Figure 1).  
Once again, participants underestimated how easy it would be to get their fellow students 
to engage in an unethical act – in this case, the act of defacing a library book, a more 
unequivocally unethical deed. Further, their predictions of how difficult the task would be 
(i.e., how many people they would have to approach to get 3 individuals to write in the 
book) were once again correlated with their estimates of how comfortable the people they 
approached would feel saying “no” to them.  (However, in this case the correlation was 
marginally significant, likely due to the smaller sample size in this study.)   
Although these findings appear to provide strong support for the prediction that 
individuals underestimate the extent to which they can influence others’ willingness to 
engage in unethical acts, these studies still leave open some alternative explanations.  For 
example, since to some extent these studies required the primary participants to act (e.g., 
by pretending they were supposed to be giving a marketing pitch for a new course), 
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primary participants may have underestimated their acting abilities rather than their 
persuasive abilities.  Or, as research on the “illusion of transparency” (Gilovich, Savitsky, 
& Medvec, 1998) might suggest, participants may have imagined that their own 
discomfort with the task would “leak out,” becoming apparent to those they approached 
and thus undermining their ability to convince people to engage in these unethical acts.  
Also, although we are convinced through our debriefings with participants and the 
comments they recorded on their tally sheets that they did indeed complete the task as 
described, we cannot be absolutely sure that some participants did not simply 
immediately inform the individuals they approached of the purpose of the study.  Another 
possibility is that participants may have envisioned the task very differently beforehand, 
and found it much easier to select those individuals who were likely to be compliant (e.g., 
those sitting around doing nothing) when they actually went out to perform the task. 
 In addition, Studies 1 and 2 do not provide specific evidence for the egocentric 
mechanism we have proposed whereby instigators fail to account for the social pressure 
they impose on actors.  In these studies, we can only compare primary participants’ 
“comfortable saying ‘no’” ratings to their own predictions of compliance, rather than to 
secondary participants’ own ratings of discomfort.  As a result, we do not know whether 
primary participants were indeed underestimating the social pressure they were imposing 
on secondary participants, i.e., the discomfort secondary participants would have 
experienced by refusing their requests.   
In Studies 3 and 4, we attempted to rectify these issues by experimentally 
assigning participants to the perspectives of “Actor” and “Instigator” (and “Neutral 
Observer,” in Study 4) in a series of hypothetical unethical scenarios.  The hypothetical 
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nature of these studies gave us more experimental control and therefore helped to 
eliminate some of the issues we faced by sending participants out in the field.  Further, 
the random assignment to perspective allowed us to compare instigators’ beliefs about 
how uncomfortable their unethical suggestions would make actors to actors’ own ratings 
of discomfort.    
Study 3: Manipulating Perspective in Hypothetical Scenarios 
In Study 3, we randomly assigned participants to the perspectives of “Actor” or 
“Instigator” in hypothetical unethical scenarios to test the prediction that our findings in 
Studies 1 and 2 were the result of Instigators’ egocentric failure to recognize the 
discomfort experienced by Actors.  We wanted to (a) confirm that Actors do indeed find 
it less comfortable to “do the right thing” when faced with an Instigator’s unethical 
suggestion, and (b) test our primary prediction that Instigators are insensitive to the 
impact of their suggestions on the discomfort actors feel doing the right thing, i.e., the 
social pressure inherent in their suggestions. 
Method 
 One hundred seventy-one participants (90 Female; 81 Male) were recruited 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $1.00 to complete an online survey. 
The study was a 2(Perspective: Actor, Instigator) × 2(Suggestion: No Suggestion, 
Unethical Suggestion) between-subjects design.  Participants read 4 scenarios describing 
ambiguously unethical situations: buying beer for underage kids, giving someone 
prescription Valium, downloading a movie illegally, and reading a colleague’s private 
Facebook messages.  See Appendix A for complete scenarios. 
Perspective Conditions 
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In the Actor condition, participants read all four scenarios from the perspective of 
the person deciding whether or not to engage in each unethical behavior.  For example, in 
the “Facebook” scenario, Actors are seated at a colleague’s computer, and she has not 
logged out of her Facebook account, which contains private messages.  In the Instigator 
condition, participants read the scenarios from the perspective of a friend or co-worker 
who was part of the situation, but not the final decision-maker.  For example, in the 
“Facebook” scenario, Instigators look over the Actor’s shoulder, but do not have access 
to the computer themselves.   
Suggestion Conditions 
In the unethical suggestion condition, the Instigator suggests that the Actor go 
ahead and engage in the unethical behavior.  For example, in the “Facebook” scenario, 
participants would read, “you lean over [your work partner leans over]…and say[s], 
‘Nice. Check out her messages…’” In the no suggestion condition, this sentence is 
omitted. 
Social Pressure Dependent Variable 
After reading each scenario, all participants answered the same social pressure 
question our primary participants answered in Studies 1 and 2.  Specifically, participants 
assessed how comfortable actors would feel doing the ethical thing in each scenario on a 
scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely), i.e., “How comfortable would someone feel 
refusing [trying not] to read their colleague’s messages in this situation?”  In the 
unethical suggestion condition, this meant that actors would be going against the 
Instigator’s suggestion to engage in an unethical act, which is essentially comparable to a 
secondary participant saying “no” to a primary participant in Studies 1 and 2. 
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Results 
We tested our hypothesis with a 2(Perspective: Actor, Instigator) × 2(Suggestion: 
Unethical Suggestion, No Suggestion) × 4(Individual Scenarios) mixed-model ANOVA. 
The content of the scenarios did not affect the pattern of results, F(1, 167)<1.6, so our 
findings are reported collapsed across scenarios.   
Main Effects 
There was an overall main effect of Perspective, F(1, 167) = 9.61, p=.002,  
indicating that participants in the Actor condition (M=5.23, SD=1.16) reported feeling 
more comfortable doing the ethically right thing overall than participants in the Instigator 
condition (M=4.68, SD=1.08) thought Actors would feel.  This finding is consistent with 
the “myth of self-interest” (Miller, 1999) from the Instigator’s perspective and a self-
serving bias (Heider, 1958) from the Actor’s perspective.  There was also an overall main 
effect of Suggestion, indicating, not surprisingly, that participants thought the Actor 
would feel more comfortable doing the ethically right thing when the Instigator said 
nothing (M=5.31, SD=1.10) than when the Instigator suggested doing the unethical thing 
(M=4.67, SD=1.16), F(1, 169) = 13.92, p<.001. 
Perspective × Suggestion Interaction 
As predicted, there was a significant interaction of Perspective × Suggestion on 
how comfortable participants thought someone would feel doing the ethically right thing, 
F(1, 167)=3.98, p=.05 (see Figure 3).  Participants in the Actor perspective felt 
significantly less comfortable doing the ethically right thing when the Instigator made an 
unethical suggestion (M=4.75, SD=1.15) than when no suggestion was made (M=5.65, 
SD=1.01), F(1, 99) = 17.66, p<.001.  However, participants in the Instigator perspective 
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failed to recognize the effect their unethical suggestion would have on the Actor. 
Instigator’s ratings of comfort did not vary between the unethical suggestion (M=4.56, 
SD=1.11) and no suggestion (M=4.79, SD=1.05) conditions, F(1, 68)<1. 
Discussion 
 These findings support an egocentric explanation for our findings in Studies 1 and 
2.  Participants who were randomly assigned to the perspective of Actor felt less 
comfortable “doing the right thing” across a variety of hypothetical unethical scenarios 
when another person – an Instigator – suggested they do the unethical thing. However, 
participants who were randomly assigned to the perspective of Instigator did not pick up 
on this difference, i.e., they did not recognize the effect that their unethical suggestion 
had on Actors compared to a condition in which they said nothing. 
 While these findings are consistent with our theory, there are a few noteworthy 
shortcomings of this study.  First, we did not include a Neutral Observer condition, which 
would help us to identify the direction of the effect.  Accordingly, in Study 4, we added a 
Neutral Observer condition.   
Second, in this study, we compared an unethical suggestion condition to a no 
suggestion condition.  In the condition in which no suggestion was offered, participants’ 
estimates of how comfortable someone would feel “doing the right thing” would have 
been based purely on their preconceptions about how comfortable someone would feel 
doing the right thing in general, rather than their theories about how social influence 
affects their own or others’ decisions.   Thus, in Study 4, we contrasted an unethical 
advice condition to an ethical advice condition so that both conditions involved social 
pressure, but in opposing directions. 
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 Third, some of the scenarios in Study 3 implicated both the Instigator and the 
Actor; that is, the Instigator was not merely advising the Actor, but acting jointly with 
him or her.  However, even individuals who are simply advising an Actor on an ethical 
dilemma without facing any ramifications of the decision for themselves should 
underestimate the power of their opinion to influence the Actor. Further, in the Study 3 
scenarios, Actors may have felt in some way that they were helping the Instigator (e.g., 
by going along with what the Instigator wanted to do), which would have made our 
scenarios too similar to the scenarios used by Flynn and Lake (2008; Studies 4 & 5).  
Thus, we created new ethical dilemma scenarios for Study 4 that would affect and 
implicate only the Actor, eliminating the possibility that Actors would reinterpret their 
behavior as a prosocial act. 
Study 4: Manipulating Perspective in Hypothetical Scenarios with a Neutral 
Observer Condition 
In Study 4, we attempted to replicate our findings from Study 3 as well as extend 
them in three primary ways.  First, we added a Neutral Observer perspective condition.  
Second, we included two social influence conditions – an unethical advice condition, and 
an ethical advice condition – rather than comparing a condition in which an Actor 
received unethical advice to a more ambiguous condition in which he or she received no 
advice.  Third, we created a new set of scenarios in which the Instigators were not 
complicit in the unethical acts, and therefore bore no responsibility nor reaped rewards 
for the acts.  In these scenarios, Instigators simply gave Actors advice about an ethical 
dilemma Actors were facing alone.  Once again, participants were assigned to different 
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perspectives and asked to read a series of vignettes.  In this case, they were assigned to 
one of three perspectives: “Actor,” “Instigator,” or “Neutral Observer.”  
Method 
 One hundred fifty-five participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk and paid $1.00 to complete an online survey. 
The study was a 3(Perspective: Actor, Instigator, Neutral Observer) × 2(Advice: 
Ethical Advice, Unethical Advice) between-subjects design.  Participants once again read 
4 scenarios describing ambiguously unethical situations; however, in this case, the 
unethical decisions affected only the Actor, not the Instigator.  The scenarios involved 
calling in sick to work to go to a baseball game, taking home office supplies (reams of 
paper) for personal use, freelancing for a corporate competitor, and putting personal 
dinners on a professional expense report. The scenarios were inspired by Wiltermuth and 
Flynn (2013)’s morally ambiguous work dilemmas, and the complete scenarios can be 
found in Appendix B. 
Perspective Conditions 
As in Study 3, participants in the Actor condition read all four scenarios from the 
perspective of the person deciding whether or not to engage in each unethical behavior.  
For example, in the “Calling in Sick to Work” scenario, Actors are offered last-minute 
tickets to a baseball game and must decide whether to call in sick the next day in order to 
attend.  In the Instigator condition, participants once again read the scenarios from the 
perspective of a friend or co-worker who is listening to the Actor’s dilemma, but is 
uninvolved in the situation and unaffected by the Actor’s decision.  For example, in the 
“Calling in Sick to Work” scenario, Instigators are simply having drinks with the Actor 
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after work, and the Actor tells the Instigator about his or her dilemma regarding whether 
to call in sick.  In the Neutral Observer condition, participants simply imagine each of the 
scenarios happening to two unknown individuals.  Neutral Observers have no role in the 
situation themselves.  For example, they are asked to imagine that someone is faced with 
the dilemma of deciding whether to call in sick from work, and that this person has 
shared this dilemma with a co-worker over drinks. 
Advice Conditions 
We had an unethical advice condition and an ethical advice condition.  In the 
unethical advice condition, the Instigator suggests that the Actor go ahead and engage in 
the unethical behavior.  For example, in the “Calling in Sick to Work” scenario, the 
Instigator says, “Sure, if it was me, I would totally do that.”  In the ethical advice 
condition, the Instigator suggests that the Actor not engage in the unethical behavior.  For 
example, in this scenario, the Instigator says, “I don’t know.  If it was me, I probably 
wouldn’t do that.”    
Social Pressure Dependent Variable 
After reading each scenario, participants answered the same social pressure 
question participants responded to in Studies 1, 2, and 3.  However, in this case, the 
question involved how comfortable Actors would feel doing the unethical thing, rather 
than the ethical thing.  That is, after reading each scenario, participants answered a 
question on a 7-point scale about how comfortable they thought actors would feel doing 
the unethical thing e.g., “How comfortable would someone feel calling in sick to take the 
day off from work?”4  
Results 
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 We tested our hypothesis with a 3(Perspective: Actor, Instigator, Neutral 
Observer) × 2(Advice: Unethical, Ethical) × 4(Individual Scenarios) mixed-model 
ANOVA. The content of the scenarios once again did not affect the pattern of results, 
F(1, 149)<1, so our findings are reported collapsed across scenarios.  
Main Effects 
There was an overall main effect of Perspective, F(1, 149) = 24.69, p<.001,  
indicating that participants in the Actor condition (M=2.84, SD=1.24) reported feeling 
less comfortable engaging in unethical acts overall than participants in the Neutral 
Observer condition [M=3.65, SD=.89, F(1, 108) = 15.93, p<.001] and the Instigator 
condition [M=4.20, SD=.78, F(1, 88) = 38.40, p<.001] thought Actors would feel.  This 
finding is again consistent with the “myth of self-interest” (Miller, 1999) from the 
Neutral Observer’s and Instigator’s perspectives and a self-serving bias (Heider, 1958) 
from the Actor’s perspective.  Interestingly, Instigators thought Actors would feel 
significantly more comfortable engaging in unethical acts than did Neutral Observers, 
F(1, 112) = 11.27, p=.001, suggesting that there is something unique about the 
“instigator” perspective that makes it different from the “neutral observer” perspective.  
There were no main effects of Advice condition. 
Perspective × Advice Interaction 
As predicted, there was a significant interaction of Perspective × Advice on how 
comfortable participants thought someone would feel engaging in unethical acts, F(1, 
149)=3.63, p=.03 (see Figure 4).  Participants in the Actor perspective reporting feeling 
more comfortable doing unethical things when the instigator gave them unethical advice 
(M=3.13, SD=1.17) than when the instigator gave ethical advice (M=2.38, SD=1.25), 
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F(1,41)=3.87, p=.056.  However, participants in the Instigator perspective once again 
failed to recognize the effect their advice would have on the actor.  Their ratings of 
comfort did not vary between the unethical advice (M=4.08, SD=.65) and ethical advice 
(M=4.32, SD=.89) conditions, F(1, 44) = 1.08, p=.30.  Neutral Observers’ ratings also did 
not vary between the unethical advice (M=3.55) and ethical advice (M=3.72) conditions, 
F(1, 66) = .59, p=.44. 
Discussion 
 We replicated our findings from Study 4 using ethical dilemmas that affected the 
Actor only.  Once again, Actors were influenced by the advice they received from 
Instigators, but Instigators failed to recognize the power of their advice to influence 
Actors.  Consistent with previous research (e.g., Bohns & Flynn, 2010; Sabini, Siepmann 
& Stein, 2001; Van Boven, Lowenstein & Dunning, 2005) Neutral Observers also failed 
to recognize the extent to which Actors were affected by social pressure.  These findings 
provide further evidence for an egocentric explanation of our findings in Studies 1 and 2. 
 Notably, our main effects analyses revealed differences in the judgments of 
neutral observers and instigators, suggesting that these are different perspectives that 
should be studied independently.  However, because neither group appreciated the role of 
social influence, the two perspectives appear to be limited by similar cognitive biases or 
constraints. 
General Discussion 
In four studies, we found that instigators failed to recognize their influence over 
actors, i.e., the social pressure they levied on actors through simple unethical suggestions.   
In Studies 1 and 2, participants underestimated how easy it would be to get their fellow 
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students to engage in unethical acts (i.e., telling a “white lie,” and vandalizing a library 
book).  Not only were participants’ predictions skewed towards underestimation in these 
studies, more than 90% of our sample in Study 1 and 87% in Study 2 erred in this 
direction.  In Studies 3 and 4, participants randomly assigned to the role of “actor” felt 
significantly less comfortable doing the “right thing” (more comfortable doing the 
“wrong thing” in Study 4) in a series of hypothetical ethical dilemmas if an instigator had 
given them unethical advice.  However, participants assigned to the role of “instigator” 
did not recognize the influence their unethical suggestions had on actors’ feelings about 
these unethical acts. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Although social psychology has mined the differing perspectives of “actors” and 
“observers,” there is very little, if any, research on the psychology of “instigators” of 
others’ behavior, particularly their unethical behavior.  Such research is important 
because in many situations we are not simply passive observers of others’ behavior, but 
are actually inciters or instigators of their behavior. That is, we are active participants in a 
situation, attempting to explain and predict others’ behavior while we are simultaneously 
influencing it (Neisser, 1980).  The current work takes a step towards closing this 
knowledge gap by examining active participants in social situations. 
The current work also suggests a broader interpretation of the original Flynn and 
Lake (Bohns) (2008) effect by extending the original findings to the realm of unethical 
behavior.  It appears that we not only underestimate the likelihood that others will help 
us.  Rather, we underestimate the extent to which we can influence others to engage in a 
variety of behaviors with a simple request. Taken together, the current findings and the 
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original Flynn and Lake (Bohns) findings suggest that we may underestimate the 
influence we have over others more generally.   
The possibility that we underestimate our influence over others is surprising in 
light of research on the “illusion of control” (Langer, 1975), overconfidence (Alicke & 
Govorun, 2005; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Moore & Healy, 2008), and magical 
thinking (Pronin et al., 2006), all of which have demonstrated a tendency to overestimate 
one’s influence in a variety of situations.  These seemingly conflicting findings may 
represent different types of attribution processes. Hamilton (1980) makes a distinction 
between causal attributions, which seek to answer the question, “Did the behavior I 
engaged in lead to the behavior someone else subsequently engaged in?” and attributions 
of responsibility, which seek to answer the question, “Could the individual have done 
otherwise?”  That is, a preceding behavior by one person may indeed “pull for” a 
subsequent behavior by another person, but if the latter person can choose to do 
something else, he or she is ultimately responsible for his or her behavior (see Bohns & 
Flynn, 2013 for a more detailed discussion).  
The obvious difference between the outcomes typically used in illusion of control 
and overconfidence paradigms (e.g., lottery tickets, IQ tests) and actors’ behaviors in our 
studies is that people have intentionality.  When we try to determine whether or not we 
influenced a physical outcome (a dice roll, the changing of a light), we need only answer 
Hamilton’s first question about causality. On the other hand, when determining whether 
or not we influenced another person’s behavior, considering contingency and our own 
intentions alone cannot provide a satisfactory answer. To understand another person’s 
behavior, we also need to consider the other person’s intentions and answer Hamilton’s 
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second question regarding responsibility. Such a determination requires perspective-
taking, a process at which people are notoriously flawed (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & 
Gilovich, 2004) 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The current studies provide compelling evidence that people underestimate the 
extent to which their suggestions affect others’ ethical behaviors and decisions. However, 
exactly what specific social pressure information instigators are overlooking and actors 
are attending to is less clear.  Actors may be willing to “bend the rules” for other people 
for many different reasons.  An instigator’s unethical suggestion may establish a 
descriptive norm (Cialdini, 2007), actors may reinterpret an unethical act as a prosocial 
act in which they are helping the instigator out, or actors may simply hope to stay in the 
good graces of the in-group.  Any of these potential motivations may be lost on 
instigators.  Future research may help to disentangle these various alternatives.     
 The possibility that actors reinterpret or reframe an unethical act as a prosocial 
act, in particular, may have played a role in a few of the scenarios in the current work.  In 
general, people are motivated to see their behaviors in a positive light, and as a result they 
will often reinterpret an unethical behavior in prosocial terms (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 
2013; Gino & Pierce, 2010; Shalvi et al., 2011; Wiltermuth, 2011).  Although this may 
have been a concern in Studies 1 and 3 in the current research, we believe that Studies 2 
and 4 address this issue.  While the unethical act was relatively ambiguous and negligible 
in Study 1, many of the individuals who were approached with the vandalism task in 
Study 2 commented explicitly about the fact that the task was unethical.  Further, while 
some of the scenarios in Study 3 involved joint-action and could therefore triggered a 
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motivation for instigators to reframe the behavior so as not to implicate themselves, in 
Study 4 instigators were merely advising actors who would be engaging in the behavior 
independently and with no costs or benefits for the instigator.  Yet, as mentioned earlier, 
many unethical behaviors are in fact conducted under the guise of helping someone out, 
so it may be worthwhile in future research to tease apart instigators’ potential neglect of 
the prosocial reframing actors may engage in to cope with the unethical behaviors they 
may enact under pressure.  
 On the other hand, instigators may also have been motivated to see their behavior 
in a more positive light, which may have influenced their judgments.  Instigators may not 
want to believe that someone else’s unethical behavior is attributable to something they 
said or did and may therefore rationalize that their influence over the actor was likely to 
be minimal.  However, if this possibility were true, we would have expected to find a 
difference between the perspectives of instigators, who have a stake in the unethical act, 
and neutral observers, who do not, in Study 4.  Yet both neutral observers and instigators 
failed to appreciate the power of social pressure to influence actors’ behaviors.  
Another potential area for future research is an exploration of the cultural 
antecedents of the tendency to discount social pressure and norms as explanations for 
people’s behavior.  This tendency may be especially prevalent in relatively individualistic 
cultures. Members of individualistic cultures are believed to act largely of their own 
volition – doing something only if it is consistent with their own personal wishes – rather 
than out of a sense of obligation or social pressure (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 
1995).  Conversely, in collectivistic cultures, the needs and goals of the group are 
supposed to usurp individual desires and personal interests (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  
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Consequently, members of collectivistic cultures may be more aware of how social 
pressures shape their own and others’ behavior.   
Cross-cultural research supports this prediction. When Flynn and Lake’s (Bohns) 
(2008) studies were replicated in a relatively individualistic culture, i.e., the United 
States, and a relatively collectivistic culture, i.e., China, the predictions of compliance 
made by Chinese help-seekers were more calibrated than those made by the American 
participants (Bohns et al., 2011).  Although the underestimation effect was still present in 
both groups, it was attenuated in the more collectivistic culture.  Further, Mazar and 
Aggarwal (2011) found that individuals who rated higher in collectivism were more 
likely to attribute unethical acts to the social context, rather than to their own personal 
will. Together, this research suggests that the current findings may also be attenuated in a 
more collectivistic culture. 
Conclusion 
Although it is common, particularly in individualistic cultures, to assume that the 
ethical decisions people make are the product of some unwavering personal integrity (or 
lack thereof), our research and others’ (e.g., Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2009; Gino & 
Galinsky, 2012; Moore & Gino, 2013) reveals the large role the social context plays in 
such decisions.  Yet, the surprising aspect of our research is not the finding that people 
will agree to tell a small lie when asked, or feel more comfortable engaging in an 
unethical behavior when a friend condones it.  The truly startling finding is the lack of 
awareness people appear to have of this tendency when they are in a position to influence 
someone else’s ethical behavior. Overall, the current research suggests that we may not 
recognize the extent to which our words and actions affect others’ ethical behavior and 
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decisions.  In an era where auditing agencies communicate openly with the companies 
they audit (Morgenson, 2008), the social dynamics of trading rooms can foster 
shockingly unethical risky shifts (McLean & Elkind, 2003), and cyber-bullying can have 
unimaginably dire consequences (Maag, 2007), the question of whether we as individuals 
understand the extent to which we contribute to a social norm, a collective value system, 
or simply another individual’s assessment of the appropriate course of action in a given 
situation has important real-world implications. 
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Footnotes 
1Flynn and Lake (Bohns) had participants obtain help from 1, 3, or 5 people, depending 
on the study, and this number did not affect their pattern of results across studies.  To 
keep our study within a reasonable time limit while obtaining enough data to accurately 
assess actual compliance, we decided to use the intermediate value from Flynn and Lake 
(Bohns)’s paper and require participants to get 3 signatures. 
2Secondary participants who asked to write in pencil were told they had to write with the 
participant’s pen.   
3The number of participants who dropped out of this study (2 participants) was too small 
to compare their predictions to the predictions of participants who completed the study. 
4This question made more logical sense in the context of the revised scenarios than a 
question about, for example, how comfortable someone would feel not calling in sick to 
take the day off from work. 
  
 Underestimating our unethical influence 33 
References 
Alicke, M. D., & Govorun, O. (2005). The better-than-average effect. The self in social 
judgment (pp. 85-106). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press, New York, NY. 
Balcetis, E., Dunning, D., & Miller, R. L. (2008). Do collectivists know themselves better 
than individualists? cross-cultural studies of the holier than thou 
phenomenon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(6), 1252-1267. 
Bohns, V. K., & Flynn, F. J. (2010). "Why didn’t you just ask?” underestimating the 
discomfort of help-seeking. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(2), 402-
409. 
Bohns, V. K. & Flynn, F. J. (2013). Underestimating our influence over others at work.  
Forthcoming in Research in Organizational Behavior. 
Bohns, V. K., Handgraaf, M. J. J., Sun, J., Aaldering, H., Mao, C., & Logg, J. (2011). Are  
social prediction errors universal? predicting compliance with a direct request across 
cultures. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(3), 676-680. 
Cialdini, R. B. (2007). Descriptive social norms as underappreciated sources of social 
control. Psychometrika, 72(2), 263-268. 
DePaulo, B. M. (1983). Perspectives on help seeking. New Directions in Helping, 2, 3-
12. 
 Underestimating our unethical influence 34 
Dunning, D., Heath, C., & Suls, J. M. (2004). Flawed self-assessment: Implications for 
health, education, and the workplace. Psychological Science in the Public 
Interest, 5(3), 69-106. 
Epley, N., Keysar, B., Van Boven, L., & Gilovich, T. (2004). Perspective taking as 
egocentric anchoring and adjustment. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 87(3), 327-339. 
Flynn, F. J., & Bohns, V. K. (2012). Underestimating One’s Influence in Help-Seeking. 
Six Degrees of Social Influence: Science, Application, and the Psychology of Robert 
Cialdini (pp. 14-26). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Flynn, F. J., & Lake, V. K. B. (2008). If you need help, just ask: Underestimating 
compliance with direct requests for help. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 95(1), 128-143. 
Gilovich, T., Savitsky, K., & Medvec, V. H. (1998). The illusion of transparency: Biased  
assessments of others’ ability to read our emotional states. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 75, 332–346. 
Gino, F., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D. (2013). Self-serving altruism? The lure of unethical 
action that benefits others. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 
Gino, F., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D. (2009). Contagion and differentiation in unethical 
behavior: The effect of one bad apple on the barrel. Psychological Science, 20(3), 
393-398. 
 Underestimating our unethical influence 35 
Gino, F., & Galinsky, A. D. (2012). Vicarious dishonesty: When psychological closeness 
creates distance from one’s moral compass. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 119(1), 15-26. 
Gino, F. & Pierce, L. (2010). Lying to level the playing field: Why people may 
dishonestly help or hurt others to create equity. Journal of Business Ethics, 95, 89-
103. 
Gunia, B. C., Wang, L., Huang, L., Wang, J., & Murnighan, J. K. (2012). Contemplation  
and conversation: Subtle influences on moral decision making. Academy of 
Management Journal, 55, 13-33. 
Greenberg, M. S. (1980). A theory of indebtedness. In K. J. Gergen, M. S. Greenberg, & 
R. H. Willis (Eds.), Social exchange: Advances in theory and research. New 
York: Plenum. 
Hamilton, V. L. (1980). Intuitive psychologist or intuitive lawyer? Alternative models of 
the attribution process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 767-
772. 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. 
Jones, T. M. (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An 
issue-contingent model. The Academy of Management Review, 16, 366–395 
Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 32(2), 311-328. 
 Underestimating our unethical influence 36 
Van Boven, L. Loewenstein, G., & Dunning, D. (2005). The illusion of courage in social 
predictions: Underestimating the impact of fear of embarrassment on other 
people. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 96, 130-141. 
Maag, C. (November 28, 2007). “A hoax turned fatal draws anger but no charges.” New 
York Times. 
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, 
emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2), 224-253. 
Mazar, N., & Aggarwal, P. (2011). Greasing the palm: Can collectivism promote 
bribery? Psychological Science, 22(7), 843-848. 
McLean, B. & Elkind, P. (2003). The smartest guys in the room: The amazing rise and 
scandalous fall of Enron. New York: Portfolio. 
Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 67, 
371-378. 
Miller, D. T. (1999). The norm of self-interest. American Psychologist, 54(12), 1053-
1060. 
Moore, D. A., & Healy, P. J. (2008). The trouble with overconfidence. Psychological 
Review, 115(2), 502-517. 
 Underestimating our unethical influence 37 
Monin, B., Sawyer, P. J., & Marquez, M. J. (2008). The rejection of moral rebels: 
Resenting those who do the right thing. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 95(1), 76-93. 
Moore, C. & Gino, F. (2013). Ethically adrift: How others pull our moral compass from  
True North, and how we can fix it. Forthcoming in Research in Organizational 
Behavior. 
Morgensen, G. (December 7, 2008). “Debt watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?”  
New York Times.  
Neisser, U. (1980). On "social knowing.". Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 6(4), 601-605. 
Newark, D., Flynn, F. & Bohns, V. K. (in press). One bitten, twice shy: The effect of a 
past refusal on expectations of future compliance. Social Psychological and 
Personality Science.  
Paharia, N., Kassam, K. S., Greene, J. D. & Bazerman, M. H. (2009). Dirty work, clean  
hands: The moral psychology of indirect agency. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 2, 134-141. 
Pronin, E., Wegner, D. M., McCarthy, K. & Rodriguez, S. (2006). Everyday magical 
powers: The role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal 
influence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 218-231. 
 Underestimating our unethical influence 38 
Reno, R. R., Cialdini, R. B., & Kallgren, C. A. (1993). The transsituational influence of 
social norms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(1), 104-112. 
Sabini, J., Siepmann, M., & Stein, J. (2001). The really fundamental attribution error in 
social psychological research. Psychological Inquiry, 12(1), 1-15. 
Shalvi, S., Dana, J., Handgraaf, M. J. J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2011). Justified ethicality: 
Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and 
behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115, 181-190. 
Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York: 
Wiley. 
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Is recent psychology not pertinent for the study of 
values? Psyccritiques, 40(4), 339-340. 
Webber, D., Schimel, J., Martens, A., Hayes, J., & Faucher, E. H. (2013). Using a bug-
killing paradigm to understand how social validation and invalidation affect the 
distress of killing. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 39(4), 470-481. 
Wiltermuth, S. S. (2011). Cheating more when the spoils are split. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115, 157-168 
Wiltermuth, S. S. & Flynn, F. J. (2013).  Power, moral clarity, and severity of punishment 
in the workplace.  Academy of Management Journal. In Press. 
 
 Underestimating our unethical influence 39 
Table 1. A sample of secondary participants’ responses to the request to vandalize a 
library book in Study 2, as recorded by primary participants. 
 
Sure, this is a library book? 
On a library book? Whoa. Yeah, okay, sure. 
I don't write on library books. Sorry about that. 
So this is like vandalism? Okay, there, you got my autograph. 
I wouldn't write on a library book 
Nahhh, it's a library book 
Why would I do that?  It is a library book. 
Is this from the library? I don't think we should write in the 
book. 
I gotta vandalize this pretty book? 
Shouldn't you use a pencil? 
I'm not sure if I should…it's a library book? 
Are you sure?  Um, okay. 
Pickle?  Are you sure?  It's a good book. 
Let's do it. 
Yeah, why in pen though? 
Are you sure I can write in this? 
Don't want to write in a library book 
Not in pen in a library book 
Only if I won't get in trouble 
I dunno, it's a nice book 
Can I write in pencil? 
Great, what prank are you playing?  I hope you don't get into 
sh&*% for this! 
Is that a library book? 
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Figure 1. Participants overestimated the number of people they would have to approach 
to get 3 individuals to agree to commit an unethical act (i.e., telling a white lie, or 
committing an act of vandalism) in Studies 1 and 2. 
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Figure 2. Fake library book vandalized by a secondary participant in Study 2. 
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Figure 3.  How comfortable an actor would feel making ethical decisions (i.e., choosing 
not to buy children alcohol, give a friend a prescription drug, download a movie illegally, 
or read a colleague’s private messages) by perspective condition and whether unethical 
advice or no advice was given in Study 3. 
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Figure 4.  How comfortable an actor would feel making unethical decisions (i.e., calling 
in sick to go to a baseball game, taking company supplies home, freelancing for a 
corporate competitor, or expensing personal dinners) by perspective condition and 
whether unethical advice or ethical advice was given in Study 4. 
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Appendix A. Study 3 Scenarios by Perspective with Unethical Advice condition in 
brackets. 
  
CONDITION                                                                                            SCENARIO 
 BUYING BEER FOR UNDERAGE KIDS 
Actor 
[Unethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that you and a friend are running into the liquor store to buy some beer to bring to a party.  A couple of kids who look 
like they're in college are standing in the parking lot across from the liquor store.  You park, get out of the car, and start walking 
towards the liquor store.  As you pass the college kids, one of them politely gets your attention, saying, "Excuse me? We really 
hate that we have to ask people this, but we're 20-years old -- almost 21, I swear!-- and so we can't buy alcohol.  If we give you 
some money, would you mind picking up a 6-pack of beer for us?"  [Your friend grins and says to you, "Let's help them 
out."] 
Instigator 
[Unethical 
Suggestion]  
Imagine that you and a friend are running into the liquor store to buy some beer to bring to a party.  A couple of kids who look 
like they're in college are standing in the parking lot across from the liquor store.  You park, get out of the car, and start walking 
towards the liquor store.  As you pass the college kids, one of them politely gets your friend's attention, saying, "Excuse me? We 
really hate that we have to ask people this, but we're 20-years old -- almost 21, I swear!-- and so we can't buy alcohol.  If we 
give you some money, would you mind picking up a 6-pack of beer for us?"  [You grin and say to your friend, "Let's help 
them out."] 
 GIVING A FRIEND PRESCRIPTION VALIUM 
Actor 
[Unethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that you previously went through a rough period in your life during which you experienced anxiety and panic 
attacks.  To cope, you wound up getting a prescription for Valium, an anti-anxiety drug, from your doctor.  However, you only 
took a few pills, and now months later, you have a pretty full prescription bottle of Valium sitting in your medicine 
cabinet.  Recently, a good friend of yours has been going through her own rough time and has similarly been struggling with 
anxiety attacks. Unfortunately, your friend doesn’t have medical insurance and would have to pay a fee in order to see a doctor 
or therapist.  [A mutual friend of yours calls you up and asks if you would be willing to give a few of your Valium pills to 
the friend who is having a rough time.] 
Instigator 
[Unethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that a friend of yours previously went through a rough period in her life during which she experienced anxiety and 
panic attacks.  To cope, she wound up getting a prescription for Valium, an anti-anxiety drug, from her doctor.  However, she 
only took a few pills, and now months later, she has a pretty full prescription bottle of Valium sitting in her medicine 
cabinet.  Recently, a mutual friend of both of yours has been going through her own rough time and has similarly been 
struggling with anxiety attacks. Unfortunately, this second friend doesn’t have medical insurance and would have to pay a fee in 
order to see a doctor or therapist.  [You call your friend with the Valium up and ask if she would be willing to give a few of 
her pills to your friend who is having a rough time.] 
 ILLEGALLY DOWNLOADING A MOVIE 
Actor 
[Unethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that you and your roommate are having some friends over for a movie night.  You are hosting because you have a 
terrific projector that connects to your computer and a screen for projecting the movie.  It makes your apartment feel like a 
movie theater!  You selected a movie in advance that everyone wanted to see.  It's a movie that is available to rent through 
iTunes and Netflix, but alternatively, you could just download it for free through a not-quite-legal file-sharing site. [Your 
roommate has made it clear that he thinks it's stupid to pay a movie you can get for free.] 
Instigator 
[Unethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that you and your roommate are having some friends over for a movie night.  You are hosting because your roommate 
has a terrific projector that connects to his computer and a screen for projecting the movie.  It makes your apartment feel like a 
movie theater!  Your roommate selected a movie in advance that everyone wanted to see.  It's a movie that is available to rent 
through iTunes and Netflix, but alternatively, it can just be downloaded for free through a not-quite-legal file-sharing site.  [You 
have made it clear to your roommate that you think it's stupid to pay for a movie you can get for free.] 
 READING A COLLEAGUE’S PRIVATE MESSAGES 
Actor 
[Unethical 
Suggestion] 
You and a colleague are working on a project at your desk.  You realize the project would go faster if you both were able to 
work on computers simultaneously.  Unfortunately, your desks are far apart in the office and you both have immobile desktop 
computers.  Another colleague usually sits right next to you, but she is away from her desk for a couple of hours.  You decide to 
let your work partner use your computer while you move over to your mutual colleague’s desk.  You open up the internet 
browser on your colleague’s computer and notice that she is still logged into Facebook.  Recently, there have been rumors about 
this colleague’s personal life that you could probably confirm or deny simply by peaking at her Facebook messages.  [Your 
work partner looks over your shoulder, grins, and says, “Nice.  Check out her messages, and let’s see if the rumors are 
true.”] 
Instigator 
[Unethical 
Suggestion] 
You and a colleague are working on a project at his desk.  You realize the project would go faster if you both were able to work 
on computers simultaneously.  Unfortunately, your desks are far apart in the office and you both have immobile desktop 
computers.  Another colleague usually sits right next to your work partner, but she is away from her desk for a couple of 
hours.  Your work partner decides to let you use his computer while he moves over to your mutual colleague’s desk.  He opens 
up the internet browser on your colleague’s computer and notices that she is still logged into Facebook.  Recently, there have 
been rumors about this colleague’s personal life that you could probably confirm or deny simply by peaking at her Facebook 
messages.  [You look over your work partner’s shoulder, grin, and say, “Nice.  Check out her messages, and let’s see if 
the rumors are true.”] 
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Appendix B. Study 4 Scenarios by Perspective with Unethical Advice/Ethical Advice 
conditions in brackets. 
 
CONDITION                                                                                                 SCENARIO 
 CALLING IN SICK TO GO TO A BASEBALL GAME 
Actor 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that you were just offered tickets to a baseball game that you really want to go to.  The problem is that the game is tomorrow 
afternoon, and it's too late to ask your boss to take the day off.  While you're out having drinks with a co-worker after work, you tell 
your co-worker that you're considering calling in sick the next day so you can go to the baseball game.  Your co-worker says, ["Sure, If 
it was me, I would totally do that."/"I don't know.  If it was me, I probably wouldn't do that."] 
Instigator 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion]  
Imagine that one of your co-workers was just offered tickets to a baseball game that he or she really wants to go to.  The problem is that 
the game is tomorrow afternoon, and it's too late for your co-worker to ask his or her boss to take the day off.  While you're out having 
drinks with this person after work, he or she tells you that he or she is considering calling in sick the next day to go to the baseball 
game.  You say, ["Sure, If it was me, I would totally do that."/"I don't know.  If it was me, I probably wouldn't do that."] 
Neutral 
Observer 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that someone was just offered tickets to a baseball game that he or she really wants to go to.  The problem is that the game is 
the following afternoon, and it's too late for this individual to ask his or her boss to take the day off.  While this person is out having 
drinks with a co-worker after work, he or she tells the co-worker that he or she is considering calling in sick the next day to go to the 
baseball game.  The person's co-worker says, ["Sure, If it was me, I would totally do that."/"I don't know.  If it was me, I probably 
wouldn't do that."] 
 TAKING OFFICE SUPPLIES HOME FOR PERSONAL USE 
Actor 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that you are out of printer paper at home.  The supply closest at work is full of reams of paper, but employees are not supposed 
to use office supplies for personal purposes.  As you are taking a look at what is in the supply closet, one of your co-workers walks in. 
You ask what your co-worker thinks about the possibility of your taking some printer paper home for yourself.  Your co-worker says, 
["I think that would be fine."/"I don't think it's such a good idea."] 
Instigator 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that your co-worker is out of printer paper at home.  The supply closest at work is full of reams of paper, but employees are not 
supposed to use office supplies for personal purposes.  As this person is taking a look at what is in the supply closet, you walk in. Your 
co-worker asks you what you think about the possibility of him or her taking some printer paper home for personal use.  You say, ["I 
think that would be fine."/"I don't think it's such a good idea."] 
Neutral 
Observer 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that someone is out of printer paper at home.  This person's supply closest at work is full of reams of paper, but employees are 
not supposed to use office supplies for personal purposes.  As this individual takes a look at what is in the supply closet, a co-worker 
walks in.  The person asks his or her co-worker what the co-worker thinks about the possibility of taking some printer paper home for 
personal use.  The co-worker says, ["I think that would be fine."/"I don't think it's such a good idea."] 
 FREELANCING FOR A CORPORATE COMPETITOR 
Actor 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that you are working at a corporation with a clear policy against employees working for potential competitors on the 
side.  However, your friend just began running a start-up that may one day pose a competition to your firm, and this friend has asked 
you as a favor whether you would be willing to consult for the start-up for a few hours a week.  You mention this opportunity to one of 
your colleagues at work who says, ["If you want my advice, I'd say just go ahead and do it."/"If you want my advice, I'd say you 
probably shouldn't do it."] 
Instigator 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that you are working at a corporation with a clear policy against employees working for potential competitors on the 
side.  However, your co-worker's friend just began running a start-up that may one day pose a competition to your firm, and this 
person's friend has asked as a favor whether your co-worker would be willing to consult for the start-up for a few hours a week.  When 
your co-worker mentions this opportunity to you, you say, ["If you want my advice, I'd say just go ahead and do it."/"If you want 
my advice, I'd say you probably shouldn't do it."] 
Neutral 
Observer 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine a person who is working at a corporation with a clear policy against employees working for potential competitors on the 
side.  However, this person's friend just began running a start-up that may one day pose a competition to his or her firm, and this 
person's friend has asked as a favor whether this person would be willing to consult for the start-up for a few hours a week.  This 
individual is considering whether he or she should take this opportunity on the side. He or she mentions this opportunity to one of his or 
her colleagues at work who says, ["If you want my advice, I'd say just go ahead and do it."/"If you want my advice, I'd say you 
probably shouldn't do it."] 
 EXPENSING PERSONAL DINNERS 
Actor 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that you are filling out your expense report from a conference you just attended.  Since the conference was in Hawaii, you 
brought your spouse along to make it a vacation as well.  You aren't supposed to expense non-business-related dinners, but you are 
considering putting just a couple of the romantic dinners you spent with your spouse down on your expense form.  No one would be 
able to tell.  You run the idea by a close friend who says, ["Why not? That seems okay to me."/"I don't know.  That seems pretty 
wrong to me."] 
Instigator 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine that a close friend of yours is filling out his or her expense report from a conference he or she just attended.  Since the 
conference was in Hawaii, this person brought his or her spouse along to make it a vacation as well.  Your friend isn't supposed to 
expense non-business-related dinners, but he or she is considering putting just a couple of the romantic dinners he or she spent with his 
or her spouse down on the expense form.  No one would be able to tell.  Your friend runs this idea by you, and you say, ["Why not? 
That seems okay to me."/"I don't know.  That seems pretty wrong to me."] 
Neutral 
Observer 
[Unethical/ 
Ethical 
Suggestion] 
Imagine someone is filling out his or her expense report from a conference this person just attended.  Since the conference was in 
Hawaii, this person brought his or her spouse along to make it a vacation as well.  He or she isn't supposed to expense non-business-
related dinners, but is considering putting just a couple of the romantic dinners spent with his or her spouse down on the expense 
form.  No one would be able to tell.  The person runs the idea by a close friend who says, ["Why not? That seems okay to me."/"I 
don't know.  That seems pretty wrong to me."] 
	
	
